Case studies
The work behind the numbers.
The Results cards on the startup page are the headline. This is what sat behind two of them: where each company started, the decisions that mattered, and what came of them. One client is named with permission. The other is under NDA, so it is described by what it does rather than who it is. The numbers are real either way.
- Confidential · B2B Healthtech SaaS
From MVP to about $1.4M in ARR,
in 1.5 years.
Where it started
A B2B SaaS platform that helps private and public hospitals flag high-risk patients early, so they can cut readmissions and the average cost per discharge. When I came in, the founder had a successful proof of concept and a working MVP. There was no commercialization roadmap, no pricing and no paying clients.
I worked as her founding marketer: gathering requirements, then building the commercialization roadmap, then the go-to-market strategy, then running it alongside her. That meant the pricing and the subscription model, the website and the sign-up pages, the analytics and conversion tracking, and the commercial half of the sales conversations.
$1.4M
about $1.4M CAD in annual recurring revenue by the end
27
accounts signed, closed together with the founder
60%
of demos became paying clients
4-5 wks
typical time from first conversation to paid
Two buyers, one yes
A hospital has more than one person who can say no. So the positioning spoke to both of them: budget efficiency for the people who own the numbers, and better patient outcomes for the people who own the quality of care. Giving finance and clinical leadership each their own reason to agree is a large part of why a typical deal closed four to five weeks after the first conversation, in a market known for taking months.
The first clients came through the founder's own network. After that, referrals from hospitals already using the product brought in more, with content and outbound alongside.
Pricing that made the first yes easy
Three tiers, split by feature set so that each matched the size of hospital it was for. A small hospital was not paying for what a large one needed, and a large one had somewhere to grow.
Early clients were billed quarterly, on purpose: a smaller first commitment is an easier first yes, and it gave the product time to prove itself. After the first five clients, accounts began moving to annual at around six months, on the strength of their own results. The pricing itself changed as we learned.
What the data changed
The tracking was there to be used, and two changes came straight out of it. First, the content people engaged with most was not about the money. It was patients' quality of life, and less administrative load on staff. We rebuilt the content plan around that, and sign-ups rose by about 36 percent in the following quarter, against the quarter before.
Second, a large share of people who started booking a demo never finished. The funnel showed where they left; short surveys and questionnaires showed why. We removed the steps that did not need to be there and cut the first form from twelve fields to five.
Where it ended
At the funnel level, about 5 percent of visitors signed up, 74 percent of sign-ups booked a demo, and 60 percent of demos became paying clients. Over 1.5 years, 27 accounts signed. The founder and I closed them together: she spoke to the product, I spoke to the commercials.
Five later churned, so 22 were paying when the engagement ended, at about $1.4M CAD in annual recurring revenue. I would rather show you the churn than have you wonder about it.
- Named with permission
Cascadia Tech,
13 months.
Where it started
Cascadia Tech builds custom hardware and software for the machine lathe industry. Seven to ten people, bootstrapped, in a niche narrow enough that generic marketing advice is worse than none at all.
They did not come to me with a growth problem. They came with a retention problem. They had pivoted to a new technology stack, and in the four months after the change their churn was running at about 48 percent a year. The engagement ran 13 months across 2024 and 2025.
48% → 12%
annualized churn, when we started vs the rest of the engagement
67
qualified leads in the first quarter of the campaign, against about 50 needed
5
new deals closed within four months of those leads
<$250
CAD per qualified lead
Stopping the leak first
There is no sense pouring acquisition into a bucket that is losing about half its customers a year, so retention came before any campaign. Once it was fixed it stayed fixed: churn held at about 12 percent a year for the rest of the engagement, a quarter of where it had been.
Planning backwards from five deals
The goal was theirs: five new deals a quarter. Working back from their own conversion history, that meant about 50 qualified leads, so we planned for 60 to leave a buffer. The first quarter of the campaign produced 67, at under $250 CAD per qualified lead, and the five deals closed within four months of those leads coming in.
Built to run without me
Around that sat the rest of the work: repositioning and messaging for the new stack, the campaign structure and outreach, the email workflow, and the staff training documentation so their own team could run all of it.
- Your numbers next
Thirty minutes, no decks. Bring the problem, a symptom or your analytics, and you will leave with a sharper next step that you can start implementing.